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Immortal Talks book. Read reviews from the world's largest community for readers. The book starts with two monks secretly observing a group of tribal. See the Glog! Download Ebook Immortal Talks (- Book 1) PDF: text, images, music, video | Glogster EDU - Interactive multimedia posters. Depending on your preferences, reading eBooks is convenient compared to having a book. You save space and money. Besides, with eBooks, you can read .

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Immortal Talks- Book 1 is now available exclusively on weinratgeber.info Read top stories published by Immortal Talks. Immortal Talks- Book 1 is now available exclusively on weinratgeber.info The book starts with two monks secretly observing a group of tribal people in a forested mountain. It appeared that the jungle dwellers were talking to something .

You can also verify. Fraud address of online phishsing scammer Setuu lordhanuman. You can send your questions, doubts and prayers for Lord Hanuman. They created several concocted chapters revolving around the incidents of fake Mathang tribe.

This is surprising that people who can speak with birds, animals and Hanuman Ji cannot speak Hindi or English …why? Do not donate any money to such scammer and criminals. Instead promote this awareness post in social media sites, share with friends, well-wishers and Hindus.

The direction was that Setuu lordhanuman. We noticed that you have just now read 3rd chapter. We shall release more lines when Lord Hanuman directs us to do so. Ram Check the snapshot of false claim made by them and their cunning ways of asking money for pooja. If you are Hindu then trust our ancient texts and knowledge. In no Hindu text, Hanuman ji ever said that people should worship him.

Secondly, he never asked for any favor from the people in terms of gratitude, money or offering. The basic premise of ongoing fraud done by setuu lordhanuman. This is biggest lie. Use some common sense before blindly following kaliyugi demons. We have found several Hindu brothers and sisters who fell victim to the biggest fraud setuu org of the decade. Moreover, the mantras shared by setuu lordhanuman. It is made up by con artists to dupe innocent Hindus. Do not become victim of this fraud.

The acts of this anti-Hindu Setuu lordhanuman. We have every right to protect our ethos. No anti-Hindu or non-Hindu can ever think of maligning our culture and ancient texts for earning money. Therefore, perhaps we can imagine scenarios that are not really possible. Consider the Barber Paradox. At first, it seems possible that, in a town, a man shaves only those persons that shave themselves.

We may perhaps imagine such a situation, but logically there cannot be such a situation, as Bertrand Russell showed. The lesson to be learned is that imagination might not be a good guide to possibility. And, although Descartes appears to have no trouble imagining an incorporeal mind, such a scenario might not be possible. However, dualists may argue that there is no neat difference between a psychological and a logical process, as logic seems to be itself a psychological process.

Descartes presents another argument.

As Leibniz would later formalize in the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, two entities can be considered identical, if and only if, they exhaustively share the same attributes. Descartes exploits this principle, and attempts to find a property of the mind not shared by the body or vice versa , in order to argue that they are not identical, and hence, are separate substances. Descartes believed, then, that mind and body cannot be the same substance. Descartes put forth another similar argument: the body has extension in space, and as such, it can be attributed physical properties.

We may ask, for instance, what the weight of a hand is, or what the longitude of a leg is. But the mind has no extension, and therefore, it has no physical properties. It makes no sense to ask what the color of the desire to eat strawberries is, or what the weight of Communist ideology is. If the body has extension, and the mind has no extension, then the mind can be considered a separate substance.

Descartes famously contemplated the possibility that an evil demon might be deceiving him about the world. Perhaps the world is not real. For, again, they do not share exhaustively the same attributes. These arguments are not without critics. But, in some contexts, it seems possible that A and B may be identical, even if that does not imply that everything predicated of A can be predicated of B.

Consider, for example, a masked man that robs a bank. And, what people believe about substances are not properties. To be an object of doubt is not, strictly speaking, a property, but rather, an intentional relation.


Some philosophers argue that the mind is private, whereas the body is not. Any person may know the state of my body, but no person, including even possibly myself, can truly know the state of my mind. The mind has intentionality, whereas the body does not. Thoughts are about something, whereas body parts are not. In as much as thoughts have intentionality, they may also have truth values.

Not all thoughts, of course, are true or false, but at least those thoughts that pretend to represent the world, may be. Again, these arguments exploit the differences between mind and body.

Arguments against Dualism Opponents of dualism not only reject their arguments; they also highlight conceptual and empirical problems with this doctrine. Most opponents of dualism are materialists: they believe that mental stuff is really identical to the brain, or at the most, an epiphenomenon of the brain.

Materialism need not undermine all expectations of immortality see resurrection below , but it does undermine the immortality of the soul.

If the mind is an immaterial substance, how can it interact with material substances? The desire to move my hand allegedly moves my hand, but how exactly does that occur? Daniel Dennett has ridiculed this inconsistency by appealing to the comic-strip character Casper. This friendly ghost is immaterial because he is able to go through walls. But, all of a sudden, he is also able to catch a ball. The same inconsistency appears with dualism: in its interaction with the body, sometimes the mind does not interact with the body, sometimes it does Dennett, Dualists have offered some solutions to this problem.

Occasionalists hold that God directly causes material events. Thus, mind and body never interact.

The Soon to Be Immortal Talks to Himself

Likewise, parallelists hold that mental and physical events are coordinated by God so that they appear to cause each other, but in fact, they do not. These alternatives are in fact rejected by most contemporary philosophers. Some dualists, however, may reply that the fact that we cannot fully explain how body and soul interact, does not imply that interaction does not take place.

We know many things happen in the universe, although we do not know how they happen. If we cannot explain how that occurs, we should not try to pretend that it does not occur. On the other hand, Dualism postulates the existence of an incorporeal mind, but it is not clear that this is a coherent concept.

In the opinion of most dualists, the incorporeal mind does perceive. But, it is not clear how the mind can perceive without sensory organs. Descartes seemed to have no problems in imagining an incorporeal existence, in his thought experiment. However, John Hospers, for instance, believes that such a scenario is simply not imaginable: You see with eyes?

No, you have no eyes, since you have no body. But let that pass for a moment; you have experiences similar to what you would have if you had eyes to see with. But how can you look toward the foot of the bed or toward the mirror? How can you look in one direction or another if you have no head to turn? Your body seems to be involved in every activity we try to describe even though we have tried to imagine existing without it.

Hospers, Furthermore, even if an incorporeal existence were in fact possible, it could be terribly lonely. For, without a body, could it be possible to communicate with other minds. Edwards, However, consider that, even in the absence of a body, great pleasures may be attained. We may live in a situation the material world is an illusion in fact, idealists inspired in Berkley lean towards such a position , and yet, enjoy existence.

For, even without a body, we may enjoy sensual pleasures that, although not real, certainly feel real. However, the problems with dualism do not end there. If souls are immaterial and have no spatial extension, how can they be separate from other souls? Separation implies extension. Yet, if the soul has no extension, it is not at all clear how one soul can be distinguished from another.

Perhaps souls can be distinguished based on their contents, but then again, how could we distinguish two souls with exactly the same contents? Some contemporary dualists have responded thus: in as much as souls interact with bodies, they have a spatial relationships to bodies, and in a sense, can be individuated.

Recent developments in neuroscience increasingly confirm that mental states depend upon brain states. Neurologists have been able to identify certain regions of the brain associated with specific mental dispositions.

And, in as much as there appears to be a strong correlation between mind and brain, it seems that the mind may be reducible to the brain, and would therefore not be a separate substance.

In the last recent decades, neuroscience has accumulated data that confirm that cerebral damage has a great influence on the mental constitution of persons. Ever since, Gage turned into an aggressive, irresponsible person, unrecognizable by his peers Damasio, And, if mental contents can be severely damaged by brain injuries, it does not seem right to postulate that the mind is an immaterial substance.

As it is widely known, this disease progressively eradicates the mental contents of patients, until patients lose memory almost completely. If most memories eventually disappear, what remains of the soul?

When a patient afflicted with Alzheimer dies, what is it that survives, if precisely, most of his memories have already been lost? Of course, correlation is not identity, and the fact that the brain is empirically correlated with the mind does not imply that the mind is the brain. Dualists may respond by claiming that the brain is solely an instrument of the soul. If the brain does not work properly, the soul will not work properly, but brain damage does not imply a degeneration of the soul.

Consider, for example, a violinist. If the violin does not play accurately, the violinist will not perform well.


But, that does not imply that the violinist has lost their talent. In the same manner, a person may have a deficient brain, and yet, retain her soul intact. Dualists may also suggest that the mind is not identical to the soul. In fact, whereas many philosophers tend to consider the soul and mind identical, various religions consider that a person is actually made up of by three substances: body, mind and soul.

In such a view, even if the mind degenerates, the soul remains. However, it would be far from clear what the soul exactly could be, if it is not identical to the mind. A Brief Digression: Criteria for Personal Identity Any philosophical discussion on immortality touches upon a fundamental issue concerning persons— personal identity.

If we hope to survive death, we would want to be sure that the person that continues to exist after death is the same person that existed before death. And, for religions that postulate a Final Judgment, this is a crucial matter: if God wants to apply justice, the person rewarded or punished in the afterlife must be the very same person whose deeds determine the outcome.

The question of personal identity refers to the criterion upon which a person remains the same that is, numerical identity throughout time. Traditionally, philosophers have discussed three main criteria: soul, body and psychological continuity. The Soul Criterion According to the soul criterion for personal identity, persons remains the same throughout time, if and only if, they retain their soul Swinburne, Philosophers who adhere to this criterion usually do not think the soul is identical to the mind.

The soul criterion is favored by very few philosophers, as it faces a huge difficulty: if the soul is an immaterial non-apprehensible substance precisely, in as much as it is not identical to the mind , how can we be sure that a person continues to be the same? Under this criterion, it appears that there is simply no way to make sure someone is always the same person. However, there is a considerable argument in favor of the soul criterion.

Now, which one is John? So, one of them must presumably be John, but which one?

Unlike the body and the mind, the soul is neither divisible nor duplicable. Thus, although we do not know which would be John, we do know that only one of the two persons is John. Thus, under this criterion, a person continues to be the same, if, and only if, they conserve the same body.

Of course, the body alters, and eventually, all of its cells are replaced. Is it still the same ship? There has been much discussion on this, but most philosophers agree that, in the case of the human body, the total replacement of atoms and the slight alteration of form do not alter the numerical identity of the human body.

However, the body criterion soon runs into difficulties. Imagine two patients, Brown and Robinson, who undergo surgery simultaneously. Accidentally, their brains are swapped in placed in the wrong body. Let us call this person Brownson.

Now, who is Brownson?

Most people would think the latter Shoemaker, After all, the brain is the seat of consciousness. Thus, it would appear that the body criterion must give way to the brain criterion: a person continues to be the same, if and only if, she conserves the same brain.

But, again, we run into difficulties. What if the brain undergoes fission, and each half is placed in a new body? Parfit, As a result, we would have two persons pretending to be the original person, but, because of the principle of transitivity, we know that both of them cannot be the original person.

And, it seems arbitrary that one of them should be the original person, and not the other although, as we have seen, Swinburne bites the bullet, and considers that, indeed, only one would be the original person.

This difficulty invites the consideration of other criteria for personal identity. Now, if before that event, the prince committed a crime, who should be punished? Should it be the man in the palace, who remembers being a cobbler; or should it be the man in the workshop, who remembers being a prince, including his memory of the crime?

Locke, therefore, believed that a person continues to be the same, if and only if, she conserves psychological continuity. Although it appears to be an improvement with regards to the previous two criteria, the psychological criterion also faces some problems. Suppose someone claims today to be Guy Fawkes, and conserves intact very vividly and accurately the memories of the seventeenth century conspirator Williams, By the psychological criterion, such a person would indeed be Guy Fawkes.

But, what if, simultaneously, another person also claims to be Guy Fawkes, even with the same degree of accuracy? Obviously, both persons cannot be Guy Fawkes. It seems more plausible that neither person is Guy Fawkes, and therefore, that psychological continuity is not a good criterion for personal identity. The Bundle Theory In virtue of the difficulties with the above criteria, some philosophers have argued that, in a sense, persons do not exist.

Or, to be more precise, the self does not endure changes.

Immortal Talks (- Book 1)

As a corollary, Derek Parfit argues that, when considering survival, personal identity is not what truly matters Parfit, What does matter is psychological continuity.

Parfit asks us to consider this example. Suppose that you enter a cubicle in which, when you press a button, a scanner records the states of all the cells in your brain and body, destroying both while doing so. This information is then transmitted at the speed of light to some other planet, where a replicator produces a perfect organic copy of you.

Since the brain of your replica is exactly like yours, it will seem to remember living your life up to the moment when you pressed the button, its character will be just like yours, it will be every other way psychologically continuous with you. Parfit, Now, under the psychological criterion, such a replica will in fact be you.

But, what if the machine does not destroy the original body, or makes more than one replica? In such a case, there will be two persons claiming to be you. As we have seen, this is a major problem for the psychological criterion. But, Parfit argues that, even if the person replicated is not the same person that entered the cubicle, it is psychologically continuous.

And, that is what is indeed relevant. According to this view, a person in the afterlife is not the same person that lived before. But, that should not concern us. We should be concerned about the prospect that, in the afterlife, there will at least be one person that is psychologically continuous with us.

Problems with the Resurrection of the Body As we have seen, the doctrine of resurrection postulates that on Judgment Day the bodies of every person who ever lived shall rise again, in order to be judged by God.

Unlike the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the doctrine of resurrection has not been traditionally defended with philosophical arguments. Most of its adherents accept it on the basis of faith. Some Christians, however, consider that the resurrection of Jesus can be historically demonstrated Habermas, ; Craig, And, so the argument goes, if it can be proven that God resurrected Jesus from the dead, then we can expect that God will do the same with every human being who has ever lived.

Nevertheless, the doctrine of resurrection runs into some philosophical problems derived from considerations on personal identity; that is, how is the person resurrected identical to the person that once lived? If we were to accept dualism and the soul criterion for personal identity, then there is not much of a problem: upon the moment of death, soul and body split, the soul remains incorporeal until the moment of resurrection, and the soul becomes attached to the new resurrected body.

In as much as a person is the same, if and only if, she conserves the same soul, then we may legitimately claim that the resurrected person is identical to the person that once lived.

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But, if we reject dualism, or the soul criterion for personal identity, then we must face some difficulties. According to the most popular one conception of resurrection, we shall be raised with the same bodies with which we once lived. Suppose that the resurrected body is in fact made of the very same cells that made up the original body, and also, the resurrected body has the same form as the original body.

Are they identical? Peter Van Inwagen thinks not Van Inwagen, And, if such continuity is lacking, then we cannot legitimately claim that the recreated object is the same original object. For the same reason, it appears that the resurrected body cannot be identical to the original body.

At most, the resurrected body would be a replica. However, our intuitions are not absolutely clear. Consider, for example, the following case: a bicycle is exhibited in a store, and a customer downloads it. In order to take it home, the customer dismantles the bicycle, puts its pieces in a box, takes it home, and once there, reassembles the pieces. Is it the same bicycle? It certainly seems so, even if there is no spatio-temporal continuity. We know that matter recycles itself, and that due to metabolism, the atoms that once constituted the human body of a person may later constitute the body of another person.

How could God resurrect bodies that shared the same atoms? Consider the case of cannibalism, as ridiculed by Voltaire: A soldier from Brittany goes into Canada; there, by a very common chance, he finds himself short of food, and is forced to eat an Iroquis whom he killed the day before.

The Iroquis had fed on Jesuits for two or three months; a great part of his body had become Jesuit.

Here, then, the body of a soldier is composed of Iroquis, of Jesuits, and of all that he had eaten before. How is each to take again precisely what belongs to him? And which part belongs to each?

If we accept the body criterion for personal identity, then, indeed, the resurrected body must be the same original body. But, if we accept the psychological criterion, perhaps God only needs to recreate a person psychologically continuous with the original person, regardless of whether or not that person has the same body.

John Hick believes this is how God could indeed proceed Hick, Hick invites a thought experiment. Suppose a man disappears in London, and suddenly someone with his same looks and personality appears in New York.

It seems reasonable to consider that the person that disappeared in London is the same person that appeared in New York. Now, suppose that a man dies in London, and suddenly appears in New York with the same looks and personality. Hick believes that, even if the cadaver is in London, we would be justified to claim that the person that appears in New York is the same person that died in London. And, Hick considers that, in the same manner, if a person dies, and someone in the resurrection world appears with the same character traits, memories, and so forth, then we should conclude that such a person in the resurrected world is identical to the person who previously died.

Hick admits the resurrected body would be a replica, but as long as the resurrected is psychologically continuous with the original person, then it is identical to the original person. And this one is something completely different! The author has used a wonderful narrative, like a discourse between Indian God Hanuman and some of his worshippers, called The Mahtang people. Very elegant story telling! There are many analogies shared, to help understand Spiritual concepts very easily like Karma-Desire, detachment, reincarnation, parallel universes, demonic possession etc.

I am quite intrigued with many of the ideas of 4. I am quite intrigued with many of the ideas of this book. It gives you a lot to think about.

And I'm also eagerly looking forward to reading the next part hopefully there are many more to come. For anyone looking for some clarity about life and souls, this is quite a great read. Highly recommended! I wish I could thank the writer.People who have zero experience in reading instructional fiction. We can be most lenient, tolerant but gruesome too. John Hick believes this is how God could indeed proceed Hick, Guiley, Rosemary.

New Harbinger Publications.

Not recommended.

MELAINE from Visalia
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